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COURT REFORM IN NEW YORK STATE: AN
OVERVIEW FOR 1975
By David J. Ellis*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the novel One Just Man, by James Mills, the hero, a 45
year old legal aid attorney, starts advising his clients to refuse to
plea bargain. The idea spreads, and the strain on the prisons
brings the total collapse of the New York City criminal justice
system.
I can only hope that Mr. Mills' grim message will not be
dismissed as alarmist exaggeration, because his basic premise is
quite sound; our criminal justice "system" is in such a fragile
state that even a relatively small increase in the number of defendants exercising their constitutional right to a speedy trial could
well bring it tumbling down, especially in a time of great economic instability. It is even more alarming that, despite some
impressive recent improvements in judicial administration and
productivity, things seems to be getting worse. The backlog of
undisposed felony cases in New York City increased by an ominous 20.2 percent during 1974, in spite of a more than 6 percent
drop in the number of indictments during that same period.' And
when one considers that there were about five times as many
felony arrests as there were felony indictments, 2 it is clear that

large-scale administrative plea bargaining was required to
achieve even this dismal result.
Depressing as these statistics are, they reflect but a small
part of a vast problem. Although the most dramatic failures of our
system are associated with its ineffective, and often inhumane
and unjust, efforts to "control" crime, serious deficiencies on the
civil side magnify the considerable inherent difficulty of administering justice according to law. Given this sad reality, it is not
surprising that public confidence in our system of law enforcement continues to decline.3
*Executive Director, Fund for Modem Courts, Inc.; B.A., Cornell University, 1964;
C.E.P., University of Paris, 1965; J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1969.
1. N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1975, at 1, col. 5. The number of untried felony cases in the
city rose from 10,621 on December 31, 1973 to 12,335 on December 31, 1974 while the
number of indictments fell from 22,983 in 1973 to 20,669 in 1974.
2. N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1975, at 1, col. 4. There were 101,748 felony arrests in New
York City in 1974.
3. According to the Harris poll (Harris Survey, Public Confidence in Law Enforce-
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Considering the importance our society attaches to justice,
one might expect an outraged citizenry to have been up in arms
long ago over our bleak plight. But our experience has been otherwise. Most people do not seem to take the threat too seriously.
Although generations of doom-forecasting court reformers have
filled our libraries with dire predictions and detailed roadmaps to
the promised land of speedy and equal justice, our society has
neither collapsed, nor been able to deal with this age-old problem.
As Roscoe Pound observed in 1906:4
Dissatisfaction with the administration of justice is as old as
law. Not to go outside our own legal system, discontent has an
ancient and unbroken pedigree. The Anglo-Saxon laws continually direct that justice is to be done equally to rich and to poor,
and the king exhorts that the peace be kept better than has been
wont, and that "men of every order readily submit *** each to
the law which is appropriate to him." The author of the apocryphal Mirror of Justices gives a list of one hundred and fifty-five
abuses in legal administration, and names it as one of the chief
abuses of the degenerate times in which he lived that executions
of judges for corrupt or illegal decisions had ceased. Wyclif complains that "lawyers make process by subtlety and cavilations
of law civil, that is much heathen men's law, and do not accept
the form of the gospel, as if the gospel were not so good as
pagan's law." Starkey, in the reign of Henry VIII, says: "Everyone that can color reason maketh a stop to the best law that is
beforetime devised." James I reminded his judges that "the law
was founded upon reason, and that he and others had reason as
well as the judges." In the eighteenth century, it was complained that the bench was occupied by "legal monks, utterly
ignorant of human nature and of the affairs of men." In the
nineteenth century the vehement criticism of the period of the
reform movement needs to be mentioned. In other words, as long
as there have been laws and lawyers, conscientious and wellmeaning men have believed that the attempt to regulate the
relations of mankind in accordance with them resulted largely
in injustice. But we must not be deceived by this innocuous and
inevitable discontent with all law into overlooking or underrating the real and serious dissatisfaction with courts and lack of
respect for law which exists in the United States today.
ment Has Declined, News Release, Oct. 22, 1973), only 18 percent of the American public
had confidence in our law enforcement system in 1974; a sharp drop from the previous
low of 24 percent who had confidence in 1973.
4. Pound, The Causes of PopularDissatisfactionwith the Administrationof Justice,
20 J. AM. Jun. Soc'y 178 (1937). The article was written in 1906.
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Certainly nothing that has happened since Dean Pound's
time would make his conclusions any less valid today than they
were when made sixty-nine years ago. There is still widespread
dissatisfaction with the administration of justice, accompanied,
as it was then, by disagreement as to what is wrong and what
needs to be done.
But the situation today is far different from what it was at
the turn of the century or in the reign of Henry VIII. The dissatisfactions caused by traditional problems such as delay, unnecessary complexity and inadequacy of some judicial personnel have
been magnified enormously by vastly increased caseloads. Our
rapidly changing society continues to spawn new kinds of problems at an ever-increasing rate.
Writing ten years ago, Professor Harry W. Jones explained
the origins and possible consequences of what he called "a crisis
5
in judicial administration":
Our courts are now confronted by the mid-century law explosion. This, to some extent, is a function of the population
explosion-twice as many people, therefore twice as many disputes to be settled, twice as many civil claims to be heard and
weighed, twice as many criminal charges to be tried and determined. But that is by no means the whole story of the law
explosion; the full truth is that we have a society that is far more
complex and vastly more demanding on law and legal institutions. New rights, like those of social security, have been
brought into being, and older rights of contract and property
made subject to government regulation and legal control. New
social interests are pressing for recognition in the courts. Groups
long inarticulate have found legal spokesmen and are asserting
grievances long unheard. Each of these developments has
brought its additional grist to the mills of justice.
Whatever the causes, the consequences for the legal order
are manifest. The great mass of criminal cases, divorce proceedings, and adjudications in matters of mental illness, alcoholism,
narcotics addiction, and juvenile delinquency are disposed of in
any major city on an assembly-line basis, so many cases to the
hour. What are the implications for law and social order when
untold thousands of people charged with criminal offenses are
handled in the lower courts as if they were mere blanks for
processing?
5. THE CounRs, T E Pusic, AND THi LAW EXPLOSION 2-3 (H. James ed. 1965).
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Can justice be administered on a mass-production basis?
Are there no middle ways between the glacial slowness of the
court process in personal injury suits and the frantic speed of the
magistrates' courts in misdemeanor cases? So far we have made
only a little progress in recasting our judicial institutions to
meet the quantitative burdens imposed on them by the law
explosion. There are widening discrepancies between the formal
law in the books and the law in action in the courts. These are
not cracks to be painted over but faults that imperil the structure of American justice. We are going to have to be searching
and candid in our appraisal of existing judicial procedures and
boldly imaginative in reconstructing traditional institutions to
meet the challenges of our own time.
Today our courts face ever increasing burdens as new groups
of people, such as indigent criminal defendants and offenders,
consumers and those trying to protect the environment, gain access to them.
Our judicial institutions thus face an unprecedented challenge. Huge and growing caseloads force courts to emphasize
productivity, often at the cost of justice in individual cases. As
the volume and pressure mounts, so does the threat that increasing productivity will replace the doing of justice as the principal
goal of our system, if it has not done so already.
In my view, the purpose of court reform in 1975 is not the
same as it has been in the past. As always, we must try to make
our judicial process as speedy, efficient and just as possible, but
today we must do more. We can no longer afford, if we ever could,
the luxury of burdening our judicial system with problems neither
it nor anyone else can solve, and then blaming the system for
failing. We must agree on realistic objectives, and give the courts
the resources to accomplish them. Wherever possible other means
must be found to resolve problems. The purpose of court reform
in 1975 must be to enable our judicial institutions to deal as justly
and expeditiously as possible with problems which can be dealt
with by the judicial system and cannot better be dealt with elsewhere.
While there is no general consensus as to what is wrong or
what needs to be done, there is some agreement as to which parts
of the system need the most attention. I will focus on two of the
areas in which the problems seem to me to be the most grave: the
quality of our judges, and the structure, administration and financing of our court system.
Although beyond the scope of this article, the criminal jus-
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tice system is a third major area which must be mentioned
briefly. The problem in this area cannot be solved merely by
improving and expanding the system.' An entirely new approach
is called for. If we want our criminal justice system to be at all
effective, we must substantially reduce the number of cases
brought into it, so that each case that is brought can be dealt with
on its merits.
The best way to reduce the number of cases brought into
criminal courts would be to reduce crime. I do not think this can
be done without a radical change in our social and economic
institutions, and in any case, it will take a long time. The best
we can do is to make sure that our courts get only those cases
which can be dealt with in no other way. We must prohibit an
activity only when there is a compelling social need to require
compliance with a particular norm. We cannot afford the luxury
of prohibiting activities which offend the moral sensitivities of the
majority but do not threaten anyone's rights, safety or well-being.
We cannot waste the limited resources of our criminal justice
system by enforcing laws against victimless crimes such as gambling, obscenity, prostitution, possession of drugs, and staying
open on Sunday (a criminal offense in New York). We most tolerate a wide range of behavior and accept the fact that other people's values differ from ours.
With this in mind, I will attempt in the balance of this article
to provide an overview of the nature of the two important problems confronting the New York State court system alluded to
earlier7 and the solutions which have been proposed to solve
them.
If.

PoLrrics AND COURT REFORM

In discussing court reform in New York State, it is tempting
to start by comparing conditions in New York State with an
established set of standards, such as the Standards Relating to
6. There are severe limits on what can be done to increase the number of cases our
courts can try, whether by increasing efficiency or expanding the number of courts. In
1974, there were 101,748 felony arrests, (see Association of Judges of the Criminal Court
of the City of New York, infra note 91, at 1) and 1,778 felony trials in New York City,
(see Office of Court Administration, Supreme Court (Criminal Branch): Statistical Summaries and Comparisons for New York City, February Term 1975, at 4, figure 2 (Mar. 24,
1975)). Even if last year we had had twice the number of courts we actually had, working
twice as efficiently as they actually did, less than 7 percent of all persons arrested for
felonies in 1974 could have been brought to trial. Such a system can hardly deter crime.
7. See p. 666 supra.
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Court Organization drafted by the American Bar Association
Commission on Standards of Judicial Administration
[hereinafter A.B.A. standards]. But while this approach is useful with some subjects, and has the advantage of providing a
comprehensive and respected point of reference, it has the disadvantage with respect to some questions of overemphasizing standards which may have little relevance to court reform in New
York State, since major issues concerning court reform here are
often political, not academic. Before turning to specific issues,
therefore, I would like to make a few personal observations about
New York politics.
First, politically, New York State is divided into two parts:
New York City, where Democrats usually win, 8 and the rest of the
state, where, except for a few isolated urban areas, Republicans
usually win.' This gives New York City Democratic leaders and
upstate Republican leaders at least one thing in common: they.
dispense a lot of political patronage.
Second, ethnic considerations often figure heavily in political
decisions.
Finally, in attempting to deal with the problems of our
courts, most politicians follow rather than lead a constituency
which is basically conservative in these matters.
III.

THE QuALrrY OF OUR JUDGES

Although it is our proud boast that we are a nation of laws
and not of men, our laws can never be much better than the
people who apply them. As Justice Cardozo said, "In the long
run, there is no guarantee of justice except the personality of the
judge." 0
Unfortunately, while the need to have the best judges possible seems obvious, there is substantial disagreement as to how to
get and keep good judges. There is also a continuing argument as
to how to improve the performance of or get rid of bad judges.
A.

JudicialSelection.
The state constitution prescribes the methods for selecting

8. In the present legislature, New York City is represented by 77 Democratic legislators and 15 Republicans.
9. The rest of the state is represented by 80 Republicans and 38 Democrats, 19 of
whom represent urban areas.
10. THE CoURTS, THE PuBLIc, AND Tim LAW ExpLoSION 124 (H. James ed. 1965),
quoting Justice Benjamin Cardozo.
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judges in New York. This means that any change requires a constitutional amendment, a long and difficult procedure involving
passage of the proposed amendment by two successively elected
legislatures and then approval of the voters by referendum.
Most judges are elected in partisan elections. These include
judges of the court of appeals, supreme court, county courts, surrogate's courts, family court (outside of New York City), civil
court (in New York City), district court and justice of the peace.
A few judges are appointed. The governor appoints court of
claims judges with the advice and consent of the senate, designates appellate division justices (from among elected supreme
court justices), and fills vacancies on supreme court and certain
other courts by interim appointment (interim appointees must
subsequently run for election). The mayor of New York City appoints family and criminal court judges within the city. 1
The constitutional structure, however, is misleading. In
most instances, judges run cross-endorsed and unopposed'2 and
the election is a mere rubber-stamping of the choice made by the
leader of the dominant political party in the county. While this
method does not preclude the possibility of getting good judges,
(and New York has produced its Cardozos) it facilitates and encourages the selection of judges primarily for political reasons. A
candidate's qualifications for judicial office, though not totally
irrelevant under this system, are certainly not the principal criteria for selection. Often the result has been the election of judges
with no noticeable qualifications for office, who, not surprisingly,
turn out to be bad judges.
Even in the few cases where an election is contested however,
voters cannot make an informed choice because they do not and
cannot know very much about a candidate's qualifications for
office. The voter typically faces a long list of candidates unknown
to him, who, in any case, are prevented by the Canons of Judicial
Ethics from taking meaningful positions. Besides, the realities of
political financing usually make it extremely difficult for judicial
candidates to attract any voter attention.
The result has been that judges get elected in a climate of
nearly total voter ignorance. Surveys conducted within a few days
after the election have consistently shown that more than 90 per11. N.Y. CONST. art. VI.

12. According to an unpublished study conducted by the Fund for Modem Courts,
more than 90 percent of the candidates for supreme court since 1969 ran without opposition.
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cent of the voters were unable to recall the name of a single judge
they had voted for. 3
Another problem with the election of judges is that many of
those most qualified to be judges are lost to the bench because
they are not, and do not wish to become, involved in partisan
politics.
Persistent abuses of the system, such as the alleged purchase
of a Suffolk County supreme court judgeship for $50,000 in
1968,14 have weakened public confidence in the judiciary and
made the election of judges a favorite target for court reformers
since the turn of the century.
1. The Merit System
The solution most consistently and vigorously urged to remedy the failings of our elective system is to replace it with a merit
selection system. It is the system recommended by both of the
national commissions recently established to set minimum requirements for responsive and efficient courts, the A.B.A. Commission on Standards of Judicial Administration and the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and
Goals [hereinafter N.A.C.].
Under the Merit Plan (also known as the Missouri Plan,
because Missouri (in 1940) was the first state to adopt it), judges
are appointed by an elected executive from lists of names submitted to him by broadly based, nonpartisan nominating commissions. Judges so appointed hold office for a minimum number of
years, at which time their names are submitted to the voters for
approval without opposition, the sole question being whether or
not the judge shall be retained in office. Similar elections take
place at the end of each term, unless the judge loses, retires or
otherwise leaves office, in which case a vacancy exists which is
filled by the same procedure. This post-appointment election is
called "merit retention." Although most states using merit selection also employ some form of merit retention,' 5 not all reformers
13. See, e.g., E.

ROPER,

A STUDY

OF VOTER AWARENESS

OF JUDICIL CANDIATES IN

7-13 (1954) (prepared for the Committee on Studies and Surveys of the Administration of Justice of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, the Citizens'
Committee on the Courts and the Institute of Judicial Administration); CITIZENS UNION
OF TIE CrrY CF NEW YORK, 1967 NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION CONSTITUTIoNAL REVISION COMMITrEE POSITON PAPER No. 13, at 2 (1967), citing CITIZENS UNION
RESEARCH FOUNDATION, INC., A STUDY OF VOTER AWARENESS OF CERTAIN CANDIDATES FOR
OFFICE IN NEW YORK STATE, (Dec. 1966) (mimeo).
14. N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1971, at 1, col. 1.
15. SELECTED READINOS, JUDICLL SELECTION AND TENURE 217 (Appendix I) (G. Winters
ed. 1973).
ELECTIONS,
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think it is a good idea. The A.B.A. Commission makes it optional,
and the N.A.C. takes no position on it."6
Before going any further, a distinction should be made between merit selection and other systems involving appointment
-ofjudges. Under merit selection, the appointing executive is
obliged by law to make his choice only from the limited number
of candidates recommended to him by a judicial nominating commission as best qualified. In other appointive systems, such as the
New York court of claims and the federal judiciary, the executive's power to appoint is limited, if at all, only by minimal status
requirements (such as citizenship or admission to the bar for a
specified length of time) and/or confirmation by some legislative
body. Backers of merit selection consider this difference crucial,
since some of the most flagrantly political selections have been
made under appointive systems with no safeguards.
Merit selection is supposed to cure the principal defects of
the elective system. If the nominating commissions are properly
chosen, political considerations are minimized. Selection is made
by informed persons composing a professionally staffed, nonpartisan, broadly representative nominating commission. The commission establishes standards and evaluates the qualifications of
potential candidates and is thus in a position to recommend to
an elected, and therefore politically accountable, executive a
limited number of those candidates it deems best qualified. The
nonpolitical atmosphere presumably makes the process more attractive to qualified lawyers who have not fostered political
connections.
Despite these supposed advantages, despite long-standing
dissatisfaction with and abuses of the elective system, despite the
long-time urgings of scholars and reformers in New York and
throughout the country; and despite the recommendations of the
A.B.A. Commission and the N.A.C., resistance to merit selection
remains strong in New York. Some of the opposition is philosophical, some political, and some results from the confusion caused
by the bewildering variety of merit plans which have been recently advanced.
Philosophical opposition is usually expressed in terms of
"faith in democracy" or fear of "elitism" or "bar association poli16. ABA STANDARDS § 1.21 (b)(iii); NATIONAL ADvisoRY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JusTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, COURTS, Standard 7.1 (1973) [hereinafter cited as N.A.C.
STANDARDS].
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tics" in the selection process. No matter how strong the evidence
of the unsuitability or abuse of the elective system may be, some
people will oppose any plan which takes away their right to vote.
This point of view is often accompanied by the belief that merit
selection would be just as political as election. Blatant political
favoritism in nonmerit appointive systems is often misleadingly
cited as proof of this latter belief.17
Although opposition to merit selection is usually expressed
in terms of "democracy" (and the traditional American fondness
for the elective process is a genuine concern of many people), this
concern is often used to mask motives that are purely political.
People outside of New York City who are satisfied with the elective process in their counties have little interest in changing the
system just to solve problems in the Big Apple. Minority
groups, who for the first time see the possibility of getting more
than token representation on the bench, fear that the merit
system would mean fewer minority judges. The county political
leaders who now choose most judges are in no hurry to see the
selection process taken from their hands. And legislators who
would like to finish their careers in judicial robes have a vested
interest in keeping things the way they are.
The task of political opponents of the merit plan is made
considerably easier by the plethora of competing merit plans
which have been advocated for New York. Seven major variations
of the merit plan have received substantial support, minor variations have been advanced, and proposals have also been introduced to reform the present elective system by grafting one or
more elements of the merit plan to it.
a. The Mayor's Committee: The Problem of Unlimited Nominations
The first attempt at merit selection in New York was made
by Mayor Robert F. Wagner in 1961, in fulfillment of a campaign
pledge. He set up a 24-member Mayor's Committee on the Judiciary to screen candidates for judgeships which the Mayor of New
York fills by appointment (criminal court, family court and
interim vacancies on civil court), and he agreed to appoint only
candidates found "qualified." This practice has been followed by
his successors Mayors Lindsay and Beame. The mayor himself
17. See, e.g., Alfred S. Julien, Letter to the Editor, 172 N.Y.L.J. 85, Oct. 30, 1974,
at 4, col. 8.
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appoints eleven of the twenty-four members of the Committee
and the remaining thirteen are appointed by the presiding justices of the two appellate divisions in New York City (six individually and one jointly). Anyone may propose names for consideration. The Committee recommends an unlimited number of candidates to the mayor until he finds one he is satisfied with."
Although this system has certainly kept totally unfit candidates from being named to the bench (while giving the mayor an
excuse when pressured by party leaders to appoint unqualified
candidates), it has not been entirely satisfactory. Political considerations continue to play a dominant role in the selection process
and the best qualfied candidates are not always the ones appointed; the mayor is not required to choose from a limited number of candidates, but can and does keep asking for names. For
example, during the Lindsay administration, the Committee considered 750 candidates, found 62 "exceptionally well qualified"
and 238 "qualified." Only 26 (42 percent) of those found "exceptionally well qualified" were appointed, while about 130 "qualified" judges were appointed ahead of the 36 other "exceptionally
well qualified" candidates. 9
b. The Model JudiciaryArticle-An Idea Whose Time Had Not
Come.
In preparation for the constitutional convention of 1967, the
Institute of Judicial Administration, at the request of the League
of Women voters, the Committee for Modern Courts and the
Citizens Union, prepared a Model JudiciaryArticle for the State
of New York. This Model Article contained a "pure" merit plan
for selecting judges, and represented the latest contemporary
thinking on the subject. It would have established separate judicial nominating commissions on the state, New York City and
supreme court district levels, to recommend three candidates for
each vacancy to the governor, mayor of New York City or local
county executive, depending upon the court. All judges of a
merged court system would have been covered."0
The politically-dominated constitutional convention proposed a Judiciary Article which would have left the judicial selec18. A. ASHIAN & J. ALFINi, THE KEY TO JuDiciAL MERT SELECTION: THE NOMINATING
136-41 (1974).
19. Id. at 146.
20. INSTITUTE OF JuDIcIAL ADMINISTRATION, A MODEL JuDicIARY ARTICLE FOR THE STATE

PROCESS

OF NEW YORK.
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tion system intact, and which would have made only minor
changes elsewhere. However, it was opposed by most court reformers, and met a quiet death at the hands of the voters, along
with the rest of the convention's work.
c.

The Dominick Commission Recommendations.

In 1970, the state legislature created a Temporary Commission on the New York State Court System to study and make
recommendations concerning the state court system. State Senator D. Clinton Dominick was named chairman. In its report And
Justice for All issued on January 2, 1973, the Commission found
"too much that is wrong" with the state court system, and made

180 recommendations on how to improve

it.21

The Commission

was sharply divided on the question of selection, 22 however, and
consequently called for little change in the selection process. Its
only recommendation with respect to merit selection was that, for
judgeships already filled by appointment, the governor's or
mayor's choice should be limited to candidates recommended by
a judicial nominating committee. As the report put it:"
Experience in other states has shown that the use of a committee composed of lawyers, laymen, and a judge to nominate a
limited number of qualified persons for judicial vacancies, combined with the gubernatorial appointive power, has tempered
the partisan political element in the appointive process.
Unfortunately the Commission did not think the practice
should be expanded. Concluding that "all elective and all appointive systems have virtues and flaws," 24 the Commission opted for
maintaining the elective system where it now exists.
d.

The Coalition Position-No Merit Retention.

In the spring of 1972, the Committee for Modern Courts, a
citizens organization headed by John J. McCloy, and a Coalition
of forty civic, social and professional organizations, formed an
alliance to further the increasing citizen interest in court reform.
Five working panels were established to develop consensus positions in various areas of reform, including one on judicial selec21. TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON THE NEw YORK STATE COURT SYSTEM,.
FOR ALL (1973) [hereinafter cited as DOMINICK COMM'N REP].

..

AND JUSTICE

22. DOMINICK COMM'N REP., pt. I, at 6.
23. DOMINICK COMM'N REP., pt. II, at 54.

24. Id. at 53.
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tion, tenure and removal.
The panel on selection, tenure and removal of judges issued
a report in April, 1973, calling for merit selection of all judges
without merit retention. The panel recommended that twelve
broadly based twelve-member Judicial Nominating Councils be
established, one statewide Council and one Council for each of
the state's eleven judicial districts. The non-partisan Councils,
half laymen and half lawyers, would contain no more than six
members of any single political party, and would recommend, by
a two-thirds vote, four or more candidates for each vacancy. Instead of merit retention, the panel proposed that a new and effective system of judicial discipline, coupled with the political accountability of the appointing executive, would provide a check
on the quality of judicial appointments.2 5
The argument against merit retention is similar to the one
against the elective system-the voters have no way of making an
informed decision about the performance of a judge. Opponents
of merit retention also claim that a retention election held shortly
(usually one or two years) after a judge takes office both discourages qualified people from seeking judicial office (why give up a
successful and profitable law practice if you may be voted out in
a short time) and infringes upon the judicial independence necessary to the impartial administration of the law (judges might be
inclined to make "popular" rather than proper decisions to ensure their retention).
The Coalition recommendations served as the basis for legislation introduced in the 1974 session of the legislature by Senator
John Dunne and Assemblyman Franz Leichter.2 6 Prepared in cooperation with several of the Coalition members, including the
Committee for Modern Courts, the New York State Bar Association, the League of Women Voters and the Citizens Union, the
Dunne-Leichter proposal embodied all the principal elements of
the Coalition recommendations and was enthusiastically supported by Coalition members. It died in committee, however,
and did not succeed in its purpose of unifying the efforts for merit
selection in New York State because new and powerful forces,
with differing views on the problem, had entered upon the scene.
25. COMMITTEE FOR MODERN COURTS AND A COALITION OF OTHER ORGANIZATIONS FOR
COURT REFORM (Panel on Selection,
ING THE JUDGES 2-7 (1973).

Tenure and Removal of Judges),

FINAL REPORT: JUDG-

26. N.Y.S. 7070-B (1974); N.Y. S. Con. Res. 7071-B (1974).
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e. The Gordon Committee Proposals.
After the issuance of the Dominick Commission report in
1973, the legislature established a Joint Legislative Committee
on Court Reorganization, chaired by State Senator Bernard G.
Gordon, to study the entire question of court reorganization and
make its own recommendations. After holding hearings throughout the state, Senator Gordon introduced his own proposal in
1974, which was that the election of judges to the court of appeals
be ended and replaced by a system of non-merit appointment by
the governor. 27 This proposal, opposed by virtually all reform
groups, passed the senate but died in the assembly, as did another similar Gordon proposal on gubernatorial appointment -of
the court of appeals, which would have permitted, but not required, the establishment of a judicial nominating commission to
propose candidates to the governor.28
After holding additional hearings, Senator Gordon, who is
also chairman of the senate judiciary committee, proposed a
new selection system designed to deal with two of the principal
objections to merit selection. 29 The new proposal attempts to deal
with the upstate-New York City conflict and the people's rightto-vote issue by permitting the voters in each judicial district
(New York City voting as a unit) to decide by referendum
whether they want to retain the elective system or switch to merit
selection. 3 Although this compromise approach does not fully
satisfy merit supporters because it is thought to be likely to create
a split in the "unified" court system along upstate-New York
City lines, it may receive considerable support if it appears to be
3
the only merit plan with any real chance of being passed'.
f. The Breitel Approach: Confirming Instead of Nominating
Commissions
One of the reasons that interest in merit selection has grown
in recent years is, ironically, the widely publicized races for election to the court of appeals in 1972, 1973 and 1974, the first such
contests since 1916. In the 1972 race, the voters witnessed the
27. N.Y. S. Con. Res. 7708 (1974).
28. The Reporter Dispatch (White Plains, N.Y.), May 14, 1974.
29. Ogdensburg Journal (Ogdensburg, N.Y.), Jan. 22, 1975.

30. Id.
31. It has a worthy ancestor: the original Missouri Plan contained comparable provisions. See Hyde, The MissouriNon-PartisanCourt Plan,in SELECTED READINGS, JUDICIAL
SELECTION AND TENURE 1 91, 93 (G. Winters ed. 1973).
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unusual agreement of all seven candidates for the state's highest
court that such elections should be ended. The heavily financed,
media-oriented campaign for chief judge in 1973 called attention
to the problems involved in electing judges even as the candidates
themselves made court reform the principal issue in the campaign. The 1974 race again underscored the problems of electing
judges by demonstrating the crucial role of financing in campaigns for judicial office.
The new chief judge of the court of appeals, Charles D. Breitel, has taken an extraordinarily active position on court reform.
The chief judge, himself a member of the Commission on
Standards of Judicial Administration which produced the A.B.A.
standards, has become an outspoken supporter of merit selection
and other major court reform proposals. His stand on merit selection, however, differs from that of most other reformers in New
York. Judge Breitel favors a system of merit appointment
whereby the appointing officer himself generates the names of
candidates for the bench and then submits his choice to a judicial
confirmation commission for approval or rejection. 2 This is consistent with the A.B.A. Standards, which find both the nominating commission approach and the confirmation commission approach acceptable.3

3

The N.A.C. recommendations, however,

agree with most New York reformers in finding only the nominat34

ing commission approach acceptable.

g. The Carey Position: Still Unclear.
The entire question of merit selections has taken on a new
dimension since Hugh Carey became governor in January, 1975.
In his State of the State message he made court reform, and
particularly merit selection, one of his major goals, 3 and, on February 24, 1975, by Executive Order, he instituted a "voluntary"
merit selection system for all appointments he will make.36 The
Carey plan established judicial nominating committees on the
state, departmental and county levels. The eleven departmental
committee members are chosen by a variety of people-four, in32. See Address by Hon. Charles D. Breitel, The Five Keys to Progress,Tarrytown,
N.Y., Jan. 30, 1975, on file in the office of the Hofstra Law Review.
33. ABA STANDARDS §§ 1.20, 1.21.
34. NAC STANDARDS 7.1.
35. Gov. Hugh Carey, State of the State Message, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1975, at 30,
col. 1 (city ed.).
36. Exec. Order No. 5, 9A N.Y.C.R.R. § 3.5 (1975).
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cluding the chairman, by the governor himself; four by the chief
judge of the court of appeals; two, jointly, by four legislative
leaders of both houses of the legislature; and one by the presiding
justice of the department. The state committee consists of twelve
members, two members (one from each party) plus the chairman
of each departmental committee. The county committees consist
of thirteen members, the eleven members of the departmental
committee plus two members appointed by the chief executive
officer of the county." At least four members of each committee
must be non-lawyers, and persons other than the governor appoint the majority of the members of each committee.
The governor has also said that he supports merit selection
for judgeships presently filled by election," and is expected to
introduce his own proposed constitutional amendment during the
1975 session of the legislature. Given the political power of the
governor, and the fact that his party controls the state assembly,
'his proposal will undoubtedly be a key part of any reform.
If his proposal is consistent with his past statements and
actions on the subject, it should raise some interesting questions.
First, he has previously said that he supports merit retention."
If his proposal does include merit retention, it will differ in that
respect from the position of most other reformers.
Second, in his Executive Order, he has placed no limitation
on the number of candidates he will consider for each vacancy.
In this respect he has adopted the practice of the Mayor's Committee on the Judiciary. This practice, however, has been criticized because it has the effect of allowing the appointing officer
to keep sending names to the nominating committee until he
gets one through, possibly with minimum qualifications. This is
at variance with the underlying rationale for the nominating committee approach-that it ensures that the appointment will be
made only from among those best qualified, rather from among
all those minimally qualified. It also gives rise to the suspicion
that political considerations will continue to play a major role in
the selection process.

37. Id., §§ 3, 4, 5.

38. Id.
39. Governor Carey, Press Release, Aug. 31, 1974, on file in the office of the Hofstra
Law Review.
40. Id. at 2.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol3/iss3/5

16

Ellis: Court
Reform in NewSymposium
York State: An Overview679
for 1975
Judicial
Administration

Third, his Executive Order permits a simple majority of each
committee, rather than a two-thirds majority, to make recommendations, and on the state committee, there is likely to be a
two-thirds majority of the governor's own party (all of the departmental chairmen plus one of the two members of each departmental committee). Again, this subjects the system to the charge,
and perhaps the reality, that choices will be made primarily for
political reasons.
2.

Prospectsfor Reform of the Selection Process

Despite the fact that dissatisfaction with our selection process is widespread, prospects for reform are uncertain. Many legislators who oppose the present system would prefer to reform it
within the framework of the elective system. Manhattan Democrats have recently agreed to nominate only persons found qualified by screening committees," and proposals have been introduced to make such a system mandatory. 2 There have also been
proposals to reform the campaign financing laws, change the
Canons of Judicial Ethics to permit judicial candidates to speak
out, provide for nonpartisan judicial election, and replace judicial
nominating conventions with primaries.
Even those favoring merit selection do not agree on such
basic issues as whether to have nominating or confirming commissions, who the members of such commissions should be, who
should choose them, whether merit retention should be part of the
plan, and in which courts and in which areas it should apply.
Support for merit selection is likely to depend on the way the
governor's voluntary plan works, and that will not be known for
some time.
Most important, selection of judges is such a political issue
that, in a legislature where the Democrats control the statehouse
and the assembly, and the Republicans control the senate, political factors not directly related to judicial selection are likely to
determine the outcome.
B.

Judicial Discipline.

The question of how our judges should be held accountable
is far less political than how they should be selected. There seems
to be a general consensus that the system which existed until the
beginning of this year was cumbersome and inadequate, and in41. N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1975, at 39, col. 4 (city ed.).
42. N.Y. A. 5735 (1975).
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spired little confidence among the general public. The newly established Commission on Judicial Conduct seems to be an idea
whose time has come, and debate now centers on such questions
as its membership, jurisdiction, and powers and to whom it
should report.
Recent articles such as Jack Newfield's The Ten Worst
Judges in New York, 4 3 and The Next Ten Worst Judges" and the
efforts of Special Prosecutor Maurice Nadjari have focused public
attention on the more sensational kinds of judicial misconduct,
such as corruption and venality. Provable cases of this kind, however, constitute but a small minority of all cases of judicial misconduct. The real problem is making sure that judges measure up
to certain standards of conduct in the day to day operation of the
courts without compromising judicial independence.
1. Standards and Problems of Judicial Conduct.
Although the N.A.C., A.B.A. and Dominick Commission recommendations on judicial discipline differ from each other in
some respects, there is general agreement as to the standards
which should be used to measure judicial conduct and the kinds
of problems that need to be dealt with. The A.B.A. standards
state that "A judge should be subject to discipline or removal
from office for misconduct, disability or gross incompetence
amounting to disability."4 5 The N.A.C. standards say that "A
judge should be subject to discipline or removal for permanent
physical or mental disability seriously interfering with the performance of judicial duties, willful misconduct in office, willful
and persistent failure to perform judicial duties, habitual intemperence or conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.""
The Dominick Commission's recommended grounds for discipline were "misconduct in office, persistent failure to perform
duties, habitual intemperence, conduct prejudicial to administration of justice, and final conviction of a crime punishable as a
felony or involving moral turpitude."4
The Dominick Commission fleshed out these generalities by
identifying the various types of 'Misconduct and incapacity, in
increasing order of seriousness, as follows:4"
43. NEW YORK MAGAZINE, Oct. 16, 1972, at 32.

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

The Village Voice (New York, N.Y.), Sept. 26, 1974, at 5, col. 1.
ABA STANDARDS § 1.22.
NAC STANDARDS 7.4.
DOMINICK COMM'N REP., pt. HI,at 62.
Id. at 60, 61.
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Conduct on the Bench
-administrative misconduct-such as, not filling out reports, not wearing robe, not advising proper officer of actions
-laziness-such as, starting court late, ending early, taking
afternoons or days off, taking extended vacations, not appearing at scheduled cases without explanation, slowness
in deciding cases
-lack of patience with persons in court-such as, cutting
off counsel and witnesses, being abrupt with court personnel
-rudeness and arbitrariness-such as, shouting at, berating or making derogatory comments about persons in court
-improper use of alcohol-such as, appearing in court with
odor of liquor on breath or partially under influence of
alcohol
-inability to hold court because under influence of alcohol
-showing bias against certain classes of litigants-such as,
making derogatory comments based on race, religion, or
other characteristics of persons in court
-allowing personal considerations to influence judicial decisions-such as, favoring friends or making decisions
which would indirectly favor self or friends
-corruption in office-such as, agreeing to decide a case in
favor a party in exchange for money
Conduct off the Bench
-devoting excessive time to non-judicial duties
-excessive concern with publicity
-financial "wheeling and dealing"
-indirect political activity
-associations with persons that give rise to suspicions
about partiality-for example, litigants, politicans, lawyers, or reputed underworld figures
-running for public or political office
-engaging in immoral conduct
-engaging in illegal conduct
-engaging in illegal conduct that involves moral turpitude
Physical and Mental Problems
-inability to make up mind
-physical infirmities that interfere with judicial activity
-psychological problems that interfere with judicial activity
-habitual drunkenness
-physical or mental disability that completely prevents
exercise of judicial functions.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1975

19

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 3 [1975], Art. 5
Hofstra
Law Review
[Vol. 3, 1975]

It would seem obvious that any mechanism designed to enforce these standards and solve these problems fairly and effectively would require, as a minimum, prompt action on allegations
of misconduct, a permanent investigatory staff with substantial
powers and a variety of sanctions to permit flexibility. Unfortunately, the system of judicial discipline which existed in New York
until this year included none of these elements.
2.

JudicialDiscipline in New York Today.
The state Constitution provides five procedures for removing
judges, of which three are primarily legislative-impeachment,
concurrent resolution of both houses, and vote of two-thirds of the
senate upon recommendation of the governor.49 These three procedures are largely theoretical, however, since no judge has ever
been removed by concurrent resolution, and the other two procedures have been used only once each."
The only potentially useful method for removing superior
court judges, i.e., judges of the court of appeals, supreme court,
court of claims, county court, surrogate's court and family court,
is by the court on the judiciary, a special ad hoc court which can
remove a judge for cause or retire him for mental or physical
disability.-' The court is composed of the chief judge and senior
associate judges of the court of appeals and one appellate division
justice from each department. The court can be convened only by
the chief judge on his own motion, or at the request of the Governor, the executive committee of the state bar association, or any
of the presiding justices of the appellate division departments. 2
It is separately constituted for each case filed with it, and has no
staff and no continuing existence as a body. It has been convened
only seven times since its creation in 1948.
The fifth method of removal applies only to inferior court
judges. They can be removed for cause or retired for disability by
the appropriate department of the appellate division.
Recognizing the inadequacy of these methods, the administrative board of the judicial conference, which is empowered to
investigate "criticisms, complaints, and recommendations with
49. N.Y.

50.

CONST. art.

VI, § § 23, 24.

NEW YORK STATE LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, JuDICIA RESOURCE KIT 34

(rev. 1971)

(a copy is on file in the office of the Hofstra Law Review).
51. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 22.
52. Id.
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regard to the administration of justice, 5 3 has delegated to each
department of the appellate division the responsibility for receiving and making an initial review of complaints of judicial misconduct against any judge in that department. The result has been
that, in addition to the constitutional remedy of removal, judges
may also be reprimanded by the appellate division. In the first
department since 1968, and in the second department since 1973,
judicial officers have been handled by special judiciary relations
committees. No formal procedures are used in the third and
fourth departments.
Even with the efforts of the appellate division supplementing the rarely used mechanism of the court on the judiciary, New
York's system of disciplining judges has been severely criticized.
The Dominick Commission listed eight of the most frequently
5
heard complaints :
-It is not able to handle minor cases
-It has no disciplinary power short of removal
-It is cumbersome and acts slowly
-It lacks confidentiality
-There is no permanent staff
-There is no appellate review
-It can be preempted by the legislature
-It is used so infrequently it must not be responsive to problems.
To these might be added two others:
-The system of judges-judging-judges rarely results in visible
disciplinary action, reinforcing the public's belief that judges
are more interested in protecting rather than policing the judiciary
-Most instances of judicial misconduct are never dealt with at
all, because the system is activated only when a complaint is
filed, and few people know how to file complaints. Besides, those
with the most knowledge of judicial misconduct, practicing lawyers, are extremely reluctant to initiate charges against a judge.
The legislature attempted to deal with these problems in
1974 by establishing a temporary state commission on judicial
conduct and giving first passage to a proposed constitutional
amendment which would reconstitute the court on the judiciary
and strengthen and make permanent the commission on judicial
conduct.
53. Id.
54. DOMINICK CoMM'N REP., pt. I, at 60.
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3. The New Commission and the Proposed Amendment.
On the question of what system should be used to discipline
judges, the recommendations of the A.B.A., the N.A.C. and the
Dominick Commission were substantially similar. All recommended the establishment of a permanent statewide commission
on judicial conduct, composed of judges, lawyers and laymen,
with power to receive, investigate and report or act on allegations
of judicial misconduct. 5
The model on which these recommendations were based is
the California Commission on Judicial Qualifications. Created in
1960, the California Commission consists of five judges, two lawyers and two laymen, all of whom serve four year terms. The
Commission receives, investigates and screens complaints by any
person against any California judge. If it finds the complaint
justified, it may recommend one of several sanctions to the Supreme Court of California, which makes the final decision. All
proceedings prior to filing the record in Supreme Court are confidential."
The Dominick Commission recommended a similar system
for New York, with the major difference that the commission on
judicial conduct would report to a newly constituted, permanent
court on the judiciary instead of to the state's highest court.
The N.A.C., A.B.A. and Dominick Commission recommendations were the basis for the two-part package passed by the
legislature last year, which was introduced by Senator Gordon as
chairman of the Joint Legislative Committee on Court Reorganization. The first part of the package was an act establishing a
temporary state commission on judicial conduct." The temporary
commission consists of nine persons, three appointed by the governor, four appointed by the majority and minority leaders of
both houses and two appointed by the chief judge of the court of
appeals. One of the governor's appointees must be a lawyer, and
the other two laymen. The four appointed by the legislative leaders may be either lawyers or laymen, and the two appointed by
the chief judge must be judges. 8 The commission appoints an
administrator who serves at its pleasure, and the administrator
55. ABA STANDARDS § 1.22 (a); NAC STANDARDS 7.4; DOMInICK CO M'N REP., Part II,
at 57.
56. Frankel, Judicial Discipline and Retirement: The CaliforniaPlan, ILL. B.J. 510
(1970).
57. N.Y. S. 6438-B (1974).
58. Id. § 41.1.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol3/iss3/5

22

Ellis: Court Reform in New York State: An Overview for 1975

Judicial Administration Symposium

685

may appoint a permanent staff.5 9 The commission has the power
to conduct hearings and to issue subpoenas, and is required to
issue an annual report. 0
The commission may act either on complaints it receives or
on its own initiative, and may make private "suggestions and
recommendations" to a judge "with respect to his conduct and
the performance of his official duties." If it determines that a
hearing is warranted, the judge involved has the right to appear
with counsel and the right to present evidence and to call and
cross-examine witnesses. If after an investigation, with or without
a hearing, the commission determines that the complaint warrants further action, it issues a report of its findings and recommendations to the person or body having authority over the judge
involved."1 All records and proceedings are confidential, unless
the judge involved requests that they be made public.62
The second part of the package was a proposed constitutional
amendment which reconstitutes and expands the powers of the
court on the judiciary and strengthens and makes permanent the
commission on judicial conduct.13 Under the proposed amendment, the court on the judiciary would consist of five appellate
division justices appointed by the chief judge of the court of appeals.64 It would have the power to censure, suspend, remove for
cause or retire for mental or physical disability, any judge of the
unified court system. "Cause" would include misconduct in
office, persistent failure to perform duties, and habitual intemperence and conduct on or off the bench that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice. 5 A judge charged with a felony or subject to a proceeding before the court would be suspended from
exercising the powers of his office.66 A final judgment of the court
on the judiciary could be appealed by either the judge involved
or the commission on judicial conduct to the court of appeals by
permission of such court. 7
In addition to the powers of the temporary commission, the
permanent commission established by the amendment would
59. Id. § 41.7.
60. Id. § 42.
61. Id. § 43.

62. Id. § 44.
63. N.Y. S. Con. Res. 7406-B (1974).
64. Id. § 22 (b).
65. Id. § 22 (a).
66. Id. § 22 (i).
67. Id. § 22 (j).
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have the power to recommend to the chief judge of the court of
appeals the convening of the court on the judiciary to hear and
determine charges against a judge, or to itself determine that a
judge be censured, suspended or retired. In the latter case, however, the judge involved would have the right to request within
thirty days that the court on the judiciary be convened to hear
the case, in which event the court on the judiciary would have the
power to impose whatever disciplinary measures it deemed appropriate, including removal. 8
4. Prospects for the Amendment.
Assuming that the legislature gives second passage to the
discipline amendment, it would go on the ballot in November for
approval by the voters. Its passage would be a foregone conclusion
were it not for the opposition of Chief Judge Breitel and State
Administrative Judge Richard J. Bartlett.
The chief judge's major objection to the amendment is that
it continues the court on the judiciary. Even worse, the chief
judge feels that the amendment fails to make the court on the
judiciary a permanent body as recommended by the Dominick
Commission. The court, in the view of the chief judge:"
should be abolished, for that institution is cumbersome, expensive and hopelessly time-consuming. It has no continuity of
membership, and must be convened and make its own rules for
each case. Its members are already fully engaged in work in
various parts of the state. Under the proposal, the Court on the
Judiciary would still hear de novo matters that had already
received a full hearing and review before the Commission on
Judicial Conduct. Requiring that the Chief Judge hand-pick the
members of the Court on the Judiciary in each case is not calculated to inspire public confidence in the Court. The Court of
Appeals, a permanent court whose members are chosen independently without regard to a particular case, is a better forum
for direct review of the Commission's findings.
The chief judge and the state administrative judge also see
other flaws. The amendment subjects nearly 3,000 inferior court
judges "to this unwieldy process," and provides that any judge
shall be automatically suspended from office when "charged"
68. Id. § 22 (k).

69. State of New York Office of Court Administration, Memorandum in Opposition
to S. Con. Res. 414 (1975), at 2 (Feb. 13, 1975) (on file in the office of the Hofstra Law
Review).
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with a felony, without defining what is meant by "charged." It
does not seem to empower the commission on judicial conduct to
recommend removal (although this provision is rather ambiguous). Further, it does not provide a standard by which the court
of appeals can determine whether an appeal will be heard, and
there exists the possibility that the commission "could consist
overwhelmingly of laymen." 0
Despite this opposition, however, the amendment is likely to
pass. It is supported by virtually every court reform group in the
state, and there is as yet no opposition to it other than that of the
chief judge and the state administrative judge. Although many
people agree with the chief judge that continuation of the court
on the judiciary is undesirable, especially as an ad hoc body, they
feel that this last archaic feature can be dealt with at another
time. In the meantime, the amendment represents a tremendous
improvement, and 1975 may well be the year that New York
finally gets an effective system of judicial discipline.
IV.

A.

THE STRUCTURE, ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCING OF THE
COURT SYSTEM

The Idea of Unification

Modem court reform efforts trace their origins to the celebrated address by Roscoe Pound to the 1906 meeting of the American Bar Association in St. Paul. The venerable dean shocked the
comfortable and complacent gathering by asserting that American judicial organization and procedure were archaic and were
"the most efficient causes of dissatisfaction with the present
administration of justice in America." 7 ' Pound charged that
"uncertainty, delay and expense, and above all, the injustice of
deciding cases upon points of practice" were the "direct results
of the organization of our courts and the backwardness of our
procedure. 7 2 He criticized our system of courts in three respects:
"(1) in its multiplicity of courts, (2) in preserving concurrent
jurisdictions, (3) in the waste of judicial manpower which it involves."73
Judicial power may be wasted in three ways, according to
Pound: 4
70. Id. at 2-3.
71. Pound, The Causes of PopularDissatisfactionwith the Administrationof Justice,
46 JuDIcATuRE 55, 62 (1962).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 64.
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(1) By rigid districts of courts or jurisdictions, so that business
may be congested in one court while judges in another are idle,
(2) by consuming the time of courts with points of pure practice,
when they ought to be investigating substantial controversies,
and (3) by nullifying the results of judicial action by unnecessary retrials. American judicial systems are defective in all three
respects.
The remedy, he thought, lay with the concept of unification of the
courts, which had been done in England by the Judicature Act
of 1873. Expressing his confidence in our law schools and bar
associations, Dean Pound ended on an optimistic note:7"
[W]e may look forward to a near future when our courts
will be swift and certain agents of justice, whose decisions will
be acquiesced in and respected by all.
Inothis respect, however, Dean Pound was quite wrong. Aside
from the founding of the American Judicature Society in 1913 and
the publication of an article by Dean Pound in 1927,76 little was
done to advance the theory of court unification until 1940. In that
year Dean Pound himself published another article, Principles
and Outline of a Modern Unified Court Organization,7 in which
he set forth his "controlling ideas" for court reoganization:
unification, flexibility, conservation of judicial power and
responsibility. His reorganization plan had five parts: a unified
court divided into three levels or branches; a simplified appellate
procedure with all judges being judges of the whole court; the
vesting of administrative authority for the system in the chief
judge, assisted by a professional administrative staff, the system
to be run according to modern management concepts; specialized
judges rather than specialized courts; and judicial councils, consisting of judges, lawyers and laymen, to advise and assist the
judges in the exercise of their rulemaking power, and to act as a
check against abuses. Except for simplifying appellate procedures and utilizing judicial councils, Pound's plan has been followed to some degree in many states, starting with New Jersey
in 1947.
75. Id. at 66.
76. Pound, Organizationof Courts, 11 JUDICATURE 69 (1927).
77. Pound, Principles and Outlines of a Modern United Court Organization, 23
JUDICATURE 225 (1946).
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1. Unification in New York.
New York made its first move toward unification in 1961
after nearly a decade of debate. Before the people of New York
approved a new Judiciary Article in 1961, there had been no
major reorganization of the state court system since 1846. There
were about 1500 separate and autonomous courts which administered themselves and were financed by hundreds of different
78

budgets.

The system set up by the 1961 judiciary article, which is in
effect today, represented substantial progress, but leaves much to
be done. It provides for a unified, statewide court system (in
name, at least), and a central administration authorized to supervise courts, judges and nonjudicial personnel, to provide
adequate statistics, to establish uniform rules and procedures and
to arrange for the proper transfer of cases. A structure for rational
financing was established and major improvements were made in
establishing mandatory qualifications for judges and limitations
on their outside activities.79
The new system, however, falls far short of Dean Pound's
goals. Nine different kinds of trial courts remain. The constitutional responsibility for administering the courts was given to the
four departments of the appellate division rather than centralized
under the chief judge. Court financing remains fragmented, as
major courts are financed by 59 different budgets, and each of the
thousands of city, town and village courts has its own budget.
B. Problems and Proposals
Some further progress toward unification has been made recently, particularly in the area of judicial administration. But
many reforms are only half-completed, and the problems they are
intended to solve remain. For convenience, I will discuss separately the problems and proposals in the areas of court structure,
judicial administration and financing of the court system, although the three are closely interrelated.
1. Court Structure
There is substantial agreement among the recommendations
of the A.B.A., the N.A.C. and the Dominick Commission as to
how our courts should be structured. The A.B.A. standards state
78. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, supra note 50.
79. N.Y. CONST. 1 ART. VI.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1975

27

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 3 [1975], Art. 5

Hofstra Law Review

[Vol. 3, 1975]

the general principle as follows:8"
The aims of court organization can be most fully realized in a
court system that is unified in its structure and administration,
staffed by competent judges, judicial officers and other personnel, and has uniform rules and policies, clear lines of administrative authority, and a unified budget.
The structure of the court system should be simple, consisting
of a trial court and an appellate court, each having divisions and
departments as needed. The trial court should have jurisdiction
of all cases and proceedings. It should have specialized procedures and divisions to accommodate the various types of criminal and civil matters within its jurisdiction. The judicial functions of the trial court should be performed by a single class of
judges, assisted by legally trained judicial officers. The appellate court should have general appellate jurisdiction and should
be divided into levels or tiers when a single appellate court level
cannot adequately handle the appellate caseload.
After examining the situation in New York, the Dominick
Commission recommended a unified court system like that described in the A.B.A. standards, with one significant difference.
It recommended a two-tier trial court system instead of a singletier system. This was done for two reasons. First, it was felt that
the substantial increases in salary and related operating expenses
that would result from merging the lower trial courts with the
higher courts would outweigh the anticipated benefits of the
merger. Second, the commission was concerned that a single-tier
system might become seriously bogged down by the enormous
number of minor actions at the expense of the relatively few more
81
serious actions.
The basis for the Dominick Commission's recommended consolidation was that the system of separate courts for different
types of matters causes jurisdictional and administrative problems which far outweigh any benefits which may accrue from the
2
specialized court structure.1
The Commission found three categories of jurisdictional
problems created by the separate court structure-fragmented
jurisdiction, dissimilar procedures or results in essentially similar
actions, and overlapping jurisdiction. Fragmented jurisdiction
80.

ABA STANDARDS § 1.10.

81.

DOMINICK COMM'N REP.,

pt. H, at 5.

82. Id. at 10.
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exists in situations where two courts are necessary to decide all
aspects of a case because no one court possesses the jurisdiction
to decide all the issues. This means unnecessary delay, duplication of court work, waste of judicial and nonjudicial time and
added expense to litigants. 3 Examples of fragmented jurisdiction
exist in the court of claims (court lacks equity powers and power
to implead third parties) and family court (court has jurisdiction
over custody and support matters but not over divorce, separation and annulment).
The second jurisdictional problem is that the system allows
for dissimilar procedures or results in essentially similar types of
actions. Aside from making the law more complicated than necessary, these procedural anomalies raise questions of equal treatment to litigants. Examples may be found in the difference between accounting proceedings in nearly identical actions in surrogate's and supreme court, and inconsistent eminent domain procedures in supreme court and in the court of claims. 4
Overlapping jurisdiction, the third problem caused by specialized courts, leads to forum shopping and unnecessary duplication of court staffs. For example, both the surrogate's court and
the family court have to have nonjudicial personnel processing
adoption cases, over which they exercise concurrent jurisdiction.8 5
The Dominick Commission found that the specialized court
structure created administrative problems of two kinds, both
tending to limit resource utilization and court accessibility. First,
the diffusion of higher court caseloads among five separate courts
leads to part-time courts and part-time justice in upstate counties where caseloads are light. As a result, administrative flexibility is reduced, judicial time is lost and access to the courts is
limited. Second, the multiplicity of courts creates intercourt
barriers to the free flow of court resources. Judges cannot always
be moved from courts with light caseloads to courts with heavy
caseloads. 7
In addition to the jurisdictional and administrative advantages cited by the Domick Commission, a third kind of advantage
would result from a unified trial court. It would improve the
facilities and raise the prestige and abilities of courts now consid83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 11.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 15.
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ered to be "inferior." Under the Dominick Commission's twotiered trial court system, the chief lower court beneficiary would
be the family court, which would be merged into supreme court.
Family court has a poor image. Most of the litigants are poor,
there is little financial reward for litigants or attorneys, physical
conditions in the courts are disgraceful in some areas and family
court judges are paid less and given fewer facilities and amenities
than supreme court judges. Family court judgeships are not surprisingly seen as steps to higher judicial posts, and are sometimes
occupied by people whose interests lie elsewhere. Merger could
not help but raise the dignity and improve the quality of justice
in family court.
Proponents of the single-tier trial court system make the
same case for other lower courts, which would be unaffected by
the Dominick Commission's consolidation recommendation. In
the words of the board of judges of the civil court of the city of
New York:88
Perhaps the most serious problem of fragmented and hierarchical courts is an implicit suggestion that a second class quality
of justice is to be administered in the so-called inferior court.
Service in such systems produces a sense of isolation and even
inferiority among the judges and court personnel themselves
caught up in a caste system of administering justice. Perhaps
Roscoe Pound put it best when he said, "There should be no
such thing as a system of little judges for little cases."
Advocates of the single-tier trial court have another strong
argument: consolidation into a single trial court is actually taking
place, at least in New York City, but on such an ad hoc basis as
to add to administrative confusion, to undermine morale of
judges and court personnel, and to create additional problems for
members of the bar. In 1974, forty-eight civil court judges and
seventeen criminal court judges were assigned and served as acting supreme court justices; practically every judge of the civil
court was assigned to and served in the criminal court; nine
judges of the civil court were assigned to the family court and
three judges of the criminal court were assigned to the civil
court.89 In 1974, civil court judges sitting as acting supreme court
88. Board of Judges of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Memorandum on the
Matter of Court Unification to the Subcommittee of Governor Carey's Task Force on the
Courts 5 (Mar. 4, 1975) (on file at the office of the Hofstra Law Review).
89. Id. at 5-6.
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justices disposed of 4,530 civil supreme court cases out of a total
of 21,046, more than 25 percent. At the same time, in the first
judicial district, almost half of all judges sitting in criminal term
of the supreme court were lower court judges on temporary assignment."
The use of lower court judges to handle supreme court cases
can have serious consequences. On the civil side, for example, a
case filed in supreme court can be transfered to civil court 92 without consent by the parties, whenever a supreme court justice
deems it to be of insufficient monetary value to remain in supreme court. Litigants in such cases may find their substantive
or procedural rights affected, including their rights of appeal. 3
On the criminal side, judges of the criminal court who sit as
acting supreme court justices try felony cases without the assistance of law secretaries, perform their own research and prepare
jury charges without help from the pool of law assistants. 4
Considering the strength of the arguments advanced for consolidation and the similarity of the recommendations of the national and state groups set up to study the question, it may appear surprising that no progress toward consolidation has been
made in the legislature. The explanation lies in the realm of
politics. The first political obstacle to consolidation is that, at
least at the outset, it will cost a substantial amount to raise the
salaries of judges and other personnel and improve the working
and physical conditions of the inferior courts. Legislators and
their leaders seem to have an ingrained resistance to allocating
more money for the courts.
The second political obstacle is that the political leadership
has a vested interest in continuing the separate existence of at
least two of the courts, the surrogate's court and the court of
claims. The surrogate has tremendous patronage powers because
of his power to appoint special guardians for minors whose fees
are fixed by the court. In deciding whom to appoint, surrogates
have traditionally been receptive to the suggestions of the party
90. Id. at 7.
91. Association of Judges of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Memorandum to the Governor's Task Force on Judicial & Court Reform 3 (Mar. 4, 1975) (on file
at the office of the Hofstra Law Review).
92. N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 325-d (McKinney 1972).
93. Board of Judges of the Civil Court of the City of New York, supra note 88, at 89.
94. Association of Judges of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, supra note
91, at 3-4.
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leaders who put them on the bench. In a merged court, different
judges would handle probate work at different times, and party
leaders would not always be able to count on the presence of their
own judges to hand out the patronage.
The separate existence of the appointive court of claims also
has political advantages. In the past, it has been a handy way for
the governor to reward political followers, since his power of appointment was virtually unchecked. Even with the voluntary
merit selection plan established by Governor Carey's Executive
Order, political considerations may not be totally absent from the
appointive process.
The outlook for consolidation is uncertain. Proponents have
not agreed on whether New York should have a single- or doubletier trial court system, and the financial implications are unclear.
As with other areas of reform, Governor Carey's role is likely to
be critical, as is the position of the Republican-dominated state
senate.
2. JudicialAdministration
The Court Reorganization Amendment of 1961 represented
a substantial improvement in New York's system of judicial administration. Prior to the amendment, the only court administration which existed in New York was that administered by the
judicial conference, a largely advisory body created in 1955. Although each appellate division had some control over the supreme court in its district, the courts were essentially autonomous.
The amendment provided that: 5
The authority and responsibility for the administrative supervision of the unified court system for the state shall be vested in
the administrative board of the judicial conference. The administrative board shall consist of the presiding justices of the appellate divisions of the four judicial departments.
The administrative board in consultation with the judicial conference was charged with establishing "standards and administrative policies for general application throughout the state," and
was empowered to appoint a state administrator.
The appellate divisions were to supervise the courts in their
respective departments "in accordance with the standards and
95. N.Y.

CONST. art. VI, §

28.
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administrative policies" so established, and each of the appellate
divisions was empowered to designate a departmental administrator and an administrative judge or judges. Ultimate responsiblity for the administration of the courts in each department lay
with the presiding justice of each of the appellate divisions."
The problem with the Amendment was that, although it
created the illusion of centralized administration, power was
"
actually diffused. As the Dominick Commission Report put it:
[T]he problem is largely the result of highly fragmented
and often unclear lines of top-level authority. Indeed, there is
no "top" in the New York judicial system from an administrative, management, or leadership standpoint. No one individual
or even one organizational group is ultimately accountable for
the functioning of the system as a whole; rather, overall administrative and management responsibility is divided-often in
unclear and inconsistent ways-among the judicial conference,
the administrative board of the judicial conference, the chief
judge of the court of appeals, and the four appellate divisions.
The state administrator, who might be expected by dint of his
title to play a leading administrative role, is the only top-level
official who clearly does not have the administrative authority
to do so.
The Commission recommended that:98
1. There should be a chief administrative judge responsible for
the administration of the state court system, and he should have
authority to carry out this responsibility. The judicial conference and the administrative board thereof should be abolished.
2. The chief administrative judge should be appointed by the
chief judge of the court of appeals for a term of four years. He
should not be required to be a judge or a resident of the state at
the time of his appointment.
These recommendations were basically similar to the A.B.A. and
N.A.C. recommendations, except that the A.B.A. recommended
that administrative authority be exercised by the chief judge,
assisted by an administrator and staff, rather than by a chief
administrator.9 9 Both the A.B.A. and the N.A.C. also recommended that the chief administrator serve at the pleasure of the
96. Id. § 4.
97. DOMIMCK COM1'N REP., pt. I, at 18.

98. Id. at 7.
99. ABA STANDARDS

§

1.33 (a); NAC STANDARDS

§8.1.
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chief judge rather than for a fixed term."'
Chief Judge Breitel, however, showed that an imaginative
chief judge, if he had the cooperation of the four presiding justices, could put these reforms into effect without waiting for a
constitutional amendment. Judge Breitel appointed Supreme
Court Justice Richard J. Bartlett as state administrator, and
arranged for each of the four appellate divisions to designate
Judge Bartlett as its administrative judge. 1 ' This gave Judge
Bartlett administrative authority over the entire state court
system, subject, however, to the power of any appellate division
to undo the arrangement at any time. A special statute was
passed confirming the legality of this arrangement and creating
the new title of state administrative judge for Judge Bartlett.'
Judge Bartlett subsequently reorganized the state administrator's office as the Office of Court Administration to assist him
in carrying out his new responsibilities.' 3
A constitutional amendment is still necessary, however, to
make centralized administration a permanent feature of our court
system. The Gordon Committee presented its proposal, which
was given first passage by the 1974 legislature. '"'
The Gordon proposal, although similar to the A.B.A., N.A.C.
and Dominick Commission recommendations, differs from them
in certain respects. It provides for a chief administrator of the
courts, appointed by the chief judge of the court of appeals, with
the advice and consent of the senate, to serve at the pleasure of
the chief judge for a term not to exceed four years. Reappointment would also be subject to consent of the senate. The proposed
amendment would abolish the administrative board, remove the
administrative responsibility and authority from the appellate
divisions, and vest the authority and responsibility for supervision and operation of the unified court system in the chief administrator of the courts." 5 The proposal also contains provisions
relating to the financing of the court system."'
100. ABA STANDARDS 1 § 1.41 (a)(i); NAC STANDARDS § 9.2.
101. Chief Judge Charles Breitel, Press Release, Jan. 15, 1974, on file in the office of
the Hofstra Law Review.
102. N.Y. Jud. Law § 211(1) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
103. Order of the State Administrative Judge (June 4, 1974) (authorized by N.Y. Jud.
Law § 211(1) (McKinney Supp. 1974)).
104. N.Y. S. Con. Res. 415 (1975).
105. Id. § 28.a.
106. Id. § 29.a.
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The most important difference between the Gordon proposal
and the A.B.A., N.A.C. and Dominick Commission recommendations is that it requires senate confirmation of the chief administrator. This introduces the element of politics into the selection
process. Chief Judge Breitel feels that senate confirmation threatens the independence of the judiciary and for this reason opposes
the amendment. The chief judge also opposes the amendment
because it establishes a fixed four year term for the state administrator, requiring senate reconfirmation, and because it abolishes
the administrative board and strips1 °7the appellate divisions of
their internal administrative powers.

Because of the opposition of the chief judge, the state administrative judge and the office of court administration, prospects for the amendment are unclear. It is favored by an overwhelming majority of the legislature"' and by virtually every
court reform group in the state. The chief judge's objections are
technical and seem hardly likely to appeal to a public looking for
more rather than less participation in the judicial process. It
therefore appears that a permanent system of centralized administration may be adopted in New York this year.
3. Financingthe Court System
A necessary corollary of unified structure and unified administration of the court system is unified financing. As with structure and administration, the recommendations of the A.B.A.,
N.A.C. and the Dominick Commission as to financing are quite
similar." 9 The A.B.A. standards describe the general principle as
follows:" 0
Responsibility for the financial support of state court systems
should be assumed by state government. Where this is not practicable at once, a program should be adopted for gradual assumption of this responsibility in the course of time. The court
system should receive financial support sufficient to permit
effective performance of its responsibilities as a coordinate
branch of government. The level of support should include ade107. State of New York Office of Court Administration, supra note 69.
108. According to a survey conducted by the Committee for Modem Courts in the
fall of 1974, of the 106 legislators responding (out of 210 polled), 98 percent favored passage
of the amendment. Committee for Modem Courts, Results of Court Reform Survey 2
(1974) (on file in the office of the Hofstra Law Review).
109. ABA STANDARDS § 1.50; NAC STANDARDs § 8.1; DOaNICK COMM'N REP., pt. I, at

54-73.
110. ABA

STANDARDS § 1.50.
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quate salaries for judicial and non-judicial personnel, necessary

operating supplies and purchased services, and provision as
needed for capital expenditures for facilities and new equipment. The financial operations of the court system should be
administered through a unified budget in which all revenues
and expenditures for all activities of all courts in the system are
presented and supervised.
New York has been extremely slow in moving toward a unified court budget. Before the 1961 amendment, courts were financed through hundreds of separate budgets. Local appropriating bodies had no guidelines or comparisons by which to gage
judicial budget requests. The quality of justice varied widely,
depending largely on the wealth of a particular area and the
ability of a particular judge to secure his budgetary request.
Courts which dispensed political patronage were usually in a better position to obtain adequate, and sometimes superfluous,
staffs and facilities, while courts less well situated politically
struggled to get by.
The 1961 amendment did little to improve the situation. It
stated that "the legislature shall provide for the allocation of the
cost of operating and maintaining" all of the courts in the state
except city, town and village courts. Each court was to submit
itemized estimates of its needs to the administrative board,
which would then be forwarded with the board's comments and
recommendations to the appropriating body concerned, which
would make the final decision. The state paid only the expenses
of statewide courts and certain auxiliary agencies. This represented about 20 percent of the total cost of the court system.",
The Dominick Commission identified three major drawbacks
to the present system. First, it has created undesirable disparities
in spending levels. Second, there is no overview of the overall cost
of dispensing justice. Third, there is no procedure for making
administrators for use in manactual cost data available to court
2
agement control and planning."
The Commission recommended a system "whereby a single,
comprehensive budget would be prepared by the chief administrative judge and transmitted to the governor for submission to
the state legislature. An appropriation from state funds would
then be made for all court operation.

.

. The change to a unified

111. DOMINICK COMM'N REP., pt. I, at 59-60.

112. Id. at 54-55.
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budget should take place immediately, even though there may be
a limited period thereafter during which the state charges back a
portion of the cost to municipalities in order to cushion the impact of state finances." ' The state's assumption of the total cost
of the state's court system was to take place "as rapidly as possible, and in no event over a period longer than ten years.""' The
Commission also recommended the adoption of a purpose accounting system which would allow the courts a certain amount
of discretion as to the allocation of funds, to replace the' 5 present
system of detailed line item control by the legislature."
Although the office of court administration has made some
administrative efforts to implement these recommendations, the
only legislative action was the first passage given to the Gordon
Committee amendment on administration and financing." 6 Although the proposed amendment does provide for a unified court
budget to be prepared by the chief administrator and transmitted
to the governor for inclusion in the budget, without revision but
7
with such recommendations as the governor may deem proper,"
the amendment does nothing with respect to the assumption by
the state of the costs of operating the state court system. The
provision relating to costs says only that:"'
The state shall pay the cost of operating and maintaining such
courts of the unified court system as may be provided by law;
provided, however, that political subdivisions shall reimburse
the state for a portion of such costs as may be provided by law.
In other words, it merely continues the existing practice of having
the state legislature allocate the costs between the state and the
municipalities.
If this amendment is passed by the legislature this year,
there should be increasing attention paid to the question of how
and when (if at all) the state should assume the total cost of
operating the state court system. This can be done by simple
legislation; no constitutional amendment is required. An unknown factor in the equation is the effect of the city and state
113. Id. at 54.
114. Id. at 59.
115. Id. at 56.
116. N.Y. S. Con. Res. 415 (1975). For discussion, see notes 104-108 supraand accompanying text.
117. N.Y. S. Con. Res. 415, §§ 29.a-c (1975).
118. Id. § 29.a.
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fiscal problems. The fact that the state is not anxious to take on
new obligations may be outweighed by urgent financial needs of
the city. If the state is going to provide the city with financial aid,
a good way would be to assume the cost of running the courts.
V.

CONCLUSION

The problems described in this article go to the heart of our
court system and their resolution is a necessary precondition to
making our courts more effective. But other reforms are also necessary. We must eliminate unnecessary procedural complexities,
provide for adequate court facilities and support services, and
make our criminal and juvenile justice systems more effective
and more humane. All this will take time and will surely not be
accomplished this year. But there is now a certain momentum for
court reform and 1975 may see significant progress in New York.
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